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Article 7

began in 1994 with Nelson Mandela as president and
F.W. De Klerk as one of two deputy presidents, the
country made the transition to majority control. The
DRC added its voice to renunciations of apartheid
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (651).
Eleven languages were given official status, including
Afrikaans, but the very multiplicity of sanctioned languages makes likely the growing preeminence of
English. In a pessimistic statement, Giliomee opines
that "by 2000 it appeared as if Afrikaners had become a
minority linguistic group rather than an organized ethnic
group with myths of origin and kinship, capable of
mobilization as a potent force" (665).
As a recent visitor to starkly beautiful South Africa, I
can report that it is painful to hear distant cousins
express their sense of loss when some of their children
and grandchildren emigrate for economic opportunity to
Europe, North America, Oceania, and other African
nations. Their government bureaucracies, businesses,

and universities may not exclude according to color,
language or, they think, standards of merit. They pay the
bulk of the tax burden to enlarge economic opportunities
for others and for the heavy cost of domestic security.
In addition, they buy guns, electronic alarms, guard
dogs, and protection systems for their homes, businesses, and automobiles. The representation of their interests in the political realm is destined to have minority
status as long as their lives will last. Yet they do live
under a rule of law with civil and religious liberties,
entitled, if with little joy, to free speech and economic
opportunity. They are educated, pragmatic, and
resourceful. Moreover, they are as African as the people of color around them. The burden of the sins of their
fathers and the tasks for integrating themselves into all
aspects of their multicultural society rests upon them
and their children. They may not overcome, but they
need God’s forgiveness and blessing to do more than
survive.

Religion, Economics, and Public Policy by Andrew D. Walsh (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), xii + 158
pages $67.95 cloth. Reviewed by Jonathan Warner, Professor of Economics, Dordt College.
Like many Christians, Andrew Walsh noticed early in
life that people’s religious values seem to make a difference to their views on public policy. In this book, he
seeks to analyze the “culture wars”—the battle for the
hearts and minds of America between, on the one hand,
conservative, orthodox Christians and Jews and, on the
other hand, nominal religionists whose views have been
formed by secular (and often more liberal) elites. The
former group shares a commitment to certain transcendent truths (the truths of religion), which they take to be
a guide to morality and the way to live; the latter group
does not. It is easy to see the way that this division
works out politically: the former group tends to lean
towards laissez-faire capitalism and the views of the
Republican party; the latter tends to lean towards greater
government intervention and the dogmas of the
Democratic party.
Except, of course, this picture is an oversimplification. Not all evangelical Protestants vote Republican;
nor do all secularists vote Democrat. Libertarians, whatever their religious beliefs, will tend to favour the smallgovernment approach of the Republicans; African
American Christians tend to vote Democrat.
Dr. Walsh’s thesis is that the culture-wars hypothesis
is too crude, especially in its analysis of social and economic policy. Is it really true that orthodox Christians
inevitably find that their faith leads them to support free
market economics, or that a loss of faith is associated
with more sympathy for the role of government in the
economy? Dr. Walsh answers this question by examin30 Pro Rege—June 2004

ing the history of relationships between religion and
political economy. To illustrate his arguments, Dr.
Walsh uses the second part of the book to examine the
part played by religious groups in two of the policy
debates of the mid-1990s: health-care reform (the
defeat of “Hillarycare”) and welfare reform (the 1996
amendment providing term limits for government-funded benefits). Walsh has relatively little to say on economics per se, focusing rather on the effects of religious
belief on social policy. However, underlying social policy decisions are some assumptions about economics: as
John Maynard Keynes once commented, “Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist” (The General Theory 383).
Evangelical Christianity has not always been a friend
of the political right. Dr. Walsh’s account of what he
calls the “ironies of the twentieth century” starts with
William Jennings Bryan, whose concern about the poor
made him an icon of the Democratic party long before
he became a martyr for the fundamentalist cause at the
Scopes monkey trial. And yet, after the failure with the
prohibition experiment, evangelical interest in politics
waned until the rise of the new religious right of the
Christian Coalition and Moral Majority in the 1980s.
While Bryan would stress Jesus’ compassion and concern for the poor (as expressed in the kingdom ethic of
the Sermon on the Mount), the new Christian right
stresses the need for responsibility and accountability.
The sinful nature of mankind means that people will

always try to get something for nothing, and a society
that encourages this attitude will produce a nation of
lazy and indolent people. Thus, even private charitable
giving might well be inappropriate, a conclusion
reached two centuries ago (but for rather different
reasons) by Thomas Malthus. Some proponents go
further than talking only of the need for limited
government intervention. Dr. Walsh places right-wing
Christian leaders, such as Gary North and others, within the Social Darwinist camp: because the Fall imposed
scarcity, life on earth becomes a battle: only the fittest
will survive. The invisible hand of the market mechanism is really the hand of God: wealth is a sign of God’s
blessing, and poverty, therefore, is a punishment for sin
(so that, by and large, the poor are responsible for their
own poverty). Welfare programs cause poverty and
encourage immorality, for it’s easier to get welfare
benefits if you’re a single mother than if you are
merely single. The Reagan revolution with its emphasis
on the virtue of trickle-down economics provided
the means by which the poor might be saved from
poverty.
On the other hand, the idea of a limited government
is as old as the American republic. The consensus that
the Government should stay out of people’s lives
remained an article of faith for many up until the Great
Depression. The Keynesian revolution in economics and
the discovery that, in certain circumstances, governments could successfully manipulate the economy to
remove the curse of unemployment led to the growth of
government programs to help the poor. The perceived
success of the New Deal ushered in an era of expanding
government and growth in the belief that political
action, if not exactly capable of establishing the
Kingdom of God in America, could, nevertheless,
ameliorate the fallen state of the earth. As Richard
Nixon observed in 1971, “We’re all Keynesians now.”
Nixon was speaking just before the breakdown of the
Keynesian consensus. The stagflation of the later 1970s
shifted the terms of the debate. Because government had
failed to deliver, redemption must come about, not
through more government but through less. Perhaps
political activity on this earth wasn’t even worthwhile.
Hal Lindsay’s Late Great Planet Earth, arguing that the
Rapture was imminent, reinforced this belief. Others
kept the spirit of evangelical political action alive by
arguing that the God-ordained structures of government
were overdue for a change. In contrast with western
Europe, American has maintained high levels of religious belief and practice. While there may be an elite
that is secularized, the majority of the population claims
some religious affiliation, making the various religious
constituencies important for electioneering. The minds

of believers are precious trophies to be captured in the
battles of the culture wars.
Dr. Walsh illustrates the trend to the right in
Evangelical thought by giving an account of the intellectual journey of Reinhold Niebuhr. In 1926, Niebuhr
proclaimed himself to be a socialist, but by the 1950s,
he had become famous as an anticommunist theoretician. His decreasing confidence in the possibility of
building a socialist utopia on earth prior to the second
coming of Christ mirrors the path of evangelical
thought. Russian communism, he came to see, was more
of a threat to world peace than was Western democracy.
While both Marxism and laissez-faire capitalism were
misguided in the degree of optimism they expressed for
the building of God’s kingdom on earth, the comparative peace and justice provided by the American system
was something to be welcomed.
The decline in influence of the old mainline
Protestant denominations (as the pronouncements of
their leaders tended to become politically and theologically ever more liberal than their membership) set the
stage for the rise of a challenge from the theological and
political right for the hearts of evangelical believers. Dr.
Walsh’s own denomination, the Disciples of Christ, has
not been immune from this trend. Prior to Mr. Reagan’s
presidency, successive administrations had increased
the scope of social policy in the wake of the New Deal,
based on the assumption that governments could (and
should) improve the lot of the poorest members of society. When the Reagan administration moved away from
this consensus, the National Council of Churches passed
resolutions deploring the trend. However, hardly anyone paid attention: they were at odds with the spirit of
the times. Similarly, churches’ criticisms of the first and
second Gulf Wars and of the impeachment of President
Clinton tended to be out of step with the feelings of
believers in the pews.
The history of the Roman Catholic Church in
America is different in a number of important respects.
Firstly, the Roman Catholic church was essentially one
of nineteenth-century immigrants, of the underclass in
American society. Secondly, during the twentieth century the Roman Catholic Church became steadily more
significant, as a higher proportion of new arrivals in the
U.S. were Catholic rather than Protestant. The latest
mass influx—of Hispanics—suggests that this trend will
continue. Thirdly, it is a church not given to theological
liberalism, but it is socially liberal. The long tradition of
Catholic social thought, dating back to the late nineteenth century, lines up with old mainline Protestantism
to stress compassion and the need for social justice,
while Catholic opposition to legalized abortion gives it
a common cause with the new Christian right.
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Dr. Walsh does not specifically mention the
Reformed churches in his analysis. Kuyperian sphere
sovereignty allows for a more nuanced and richer
account of the interaction of faith and culture. It is not
necessary to believe that one’s preferred positions must
be worked out via the legislative process. Thus, one
could hold both that homosexuality is an abomination in
God’s sight and that justice requires that there be no discrimination against gay men and women. As a result of
this approach, the Reformed tradition could also play a
mediating role in the culture wars, albeit from a rather
different standpoint than that of the Roman Catholic
tradition.
Religion, Economics and Public Policy was published in 2000. If anything, its thesis has become more
relevant since then. The 2000 general election showed a
nation divided in half, and the effects of President
Bush’s tenure have been to widen the rifts between the
two sides of the culture wars. The developing discussion
over gay marriage is the latest battle. The secularized
view that sexual morality is a matter of personal preference, not something in which the state should be seen to
be discriminatory, is pitted against the deeply-held con-
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viction of most Christians and Jews that the creational
norm for marriage is a life-long union between one man
and one woman. The debates over abortion, stem-cell
research, and even such matters as vouchers for education are likely to continue to be important battles in the
war.
Identification with the conservative consensus of the
1980s has declined, as America seems to be becoming
a more polarized nation. Perhaps one consequence of
the popularity of Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins’
“Left Behind” series and of the revival of a Hal Lindsay
apocalyptic will be a new cultural disengagement
by Christians. Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ,
which stresses Jesus’ suffering and the way of the cross,
will no doubt strike a chord with many who are
disenchanted with the kind of Christian triumphalism
that thinks that political action is the means of
redemption.
But this is speculation. Dr. Walsh is to be commended
for providing a clear and concise account of twentiethcentury trends in the culture wars, one that gives
perceptive hints concerning how the culture wars may
play out in the future.

